Boeing 737 MAX Safety Oversight

• The record reports that the proposal states no inspection deadline itself, and that Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-27A1331 RB sets 126 months, which for airplanes already flying would run from a final rule's effective date, with no repeat inspection.
• It reports that under the bulletin a crack, missing sealant or a failed load test must be fixed 'Before further flight.'
• It records the FAA's estimate of 95 U.S.-registered airplanes and, by the desk's own count of the bulletin's line numbers, 222 airplanes listed in all.
• It reports that the regulations.gov docket showed four public comments on September 27, 2026, with comments due November 5, 2026.

• FAA proposes inspections for 737 MAX elevator bearings that may have been installed incorrectly in production; comments due Nov 5 →Sep 21, 2026 · oversight finding

• It states: "The FAA has received a report indicating that bearings in the elevator buss assembly could have been installed incorrectly (including being installed without the application of sealant) during production."
• It states the condition "could impact elevator pitch control and affect continued safe flight and landing of the airplane."
• It states: "The FAA must receive comments on this proposed AD by November 5, 2026."
• It estimates the AD "would affect 95 airplanes of U.S. registry"; its cost table puts the bearing inspection at 23 work-hours at $85 per hour, $1,955 per product and $185,725 for U.S. operators.
• It would require the actions in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-27A1331 RB, dated December 17, 2025.

• FAA proposes inspections for 737 MAX elevator bearings that may have been installed incorrectly in production; comments due Nov 5 →Sep 21, 2026 · oversight finding

• It states: "Following almost a decade of extensive review, the FAA has issued an amended type certificate and updated Production Limitation Record for the Boeing 737 MAX-7."
• It states the FAA required the MAX-7 to incorporate "updates to the flight-control software, flightcrew alerting system, and a redesigned engine anti-ice system", addressing Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act requirements and NTSB recommendations.
• It states: "the updated Production Limitation Record authorizes Boeing to begin production of the aircraft."
• It states: "FAA safety inspectors will remain on site at Boeing production facilities across the country to closely monitor the manufacturing process, including observing and assessing Boeing's Safety Management System (SMS) and safety culture."

• FAA certifies the 737 MAX-7 and authorizes Boeing to begin producing it →Aug 3, 2026 · oversight finding

• Docket No. 4:21-CR-005-O in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas; one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. Section 371, filed with the deferred prosecution agreement in January 2021.
• On May 14, 2024, DOJ notified the court it had determined Boeing breached the deferred prosecution agreement by failing to design, implement, and enforce a compliance-and-ethics program.
• A proposed plea agreement filed July 24, 2024 was rejected by the court on December 5, 2024; a non-prosecution agreement was reached May 29, 2025; the court dismissed the charge on November 6, 2025; and the Fifth Circuit denied the victims' mandamus petitions on March 31, 2026.
• The page's Latest Update states that on May 22, 2026 the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc and issued an amended opinion, and that "The Fifth Circuit panel denied the mandamus petitions and the mandate was issued on June 18, 2026."
• The page carries the line "Updated July 24, 2026".

• DOJ's case record is restamped July 24 with nothing newer than the June 18 mandate on it →Jul 24, 2026 · records release
• Fifth Circuit issues its mandate on the families' mandamus petitions →Jun 18, 2026 · case disposition
• Fifth Circuit denies rehearing and substitutes a revised opinion, again denying the families' mandamus petitions →May 22, 2026 · case disposition
• Fifth Circuit denies the crash-victim families' mandamus petitions →Mar 31, 2026 · case disposition
• Court dismisses the charge →Nov 6, 2025 · case disposition
• DOJ and Boeing reach a non-prosecution agreement →May 29, 2025 · case disposition
• Proposed guilty-plea agreement filed, then rejected by the court →Jul 24, 2024 · case disposition
• DOJ determines Boeing breached the 2021 agreement →May 14, 2024 · oversight finding
• Court recognizes crash-victim families as crime victims →Oct 21, 2022 · case disposition
• DOJ files criminal information and deferred prosecution agreement →Jan 7, 2021 · charge

A shared source does not establish conduct or a direct personal relationship.

• The Boeing Company →charged defendant
• U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (Fraud Section) →active investigation authority
• U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas →official record holder
• U.S. District Judge Reed C. O'Connor →official record holder
• U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit →official record holder
• Representatives of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian 302 crash victims →public statement party
• Former Boeing 737 MAX Flight Technical Pilots →public statement party

• The order states: "The petition for rehearing en banc by Petitioners is DENIED."
• It states: "No member of the panel or judge in regular active service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc in this case."
• It states: "The petition for panel rehearing by Petitioners is DENIED."
• It states: "We withdraw our previous opinion, 171 F.4th 773, and substitute the following".
• The revised opinion states: "we lack jurisdiction under the CVRA to perform a substantive review of the district court’s Rule 48 dismissal."
• It concludes: "The petitions for writ of mandamus are DENIED."

• Fifth Circuit denies rehearing and substitutes a revised opinion, again denying the families' mandamus petitions →May 22, 2026 · case disposition

A shared source does not establish conduct or a direct personal relationship.

• U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit →official record holder

• The report is AV2026026, dated April 21, 2026.
• It states the FAA's Corrective Action Review Board, held November 26, 2024, recommended an NPRM requiring an airworthiness directive when load-reduction-device software updates become available.
• It states: "FAA's senior air accident investigators identified several risks and provided associated recommendations to FAA leadership. The CARB did not agree that all the investigators' concerns required action."
• It states two airlines indicated 737 MAX full flight simulators "do not incorporate LRD activation directly nor simulate smoke or fumes in the flight deck."
• The OIG made 4 recommendations; FAA "concurred with our four recommendations", and the OIG considers them "resolved but open pending completion of the planned actions." The FAA's response plans to complete recommendation 2 by November 30, 2026 and recommendations 1, 3 and 4 by May 31, 2027.
• Appendix B prints a May 22, 2026 response from the Allied Pilots Association stating that manufacturer discussions "point to an undetermined implementation date at some point in 2028" for the software modification the report said was expected in 2026.

• DOT OIG finds the FAA followed policy on 737 MAX 8 fume events but that further assessment is warranted →Apr 21, 2026 · audit report

• The statement is dated October 17, 2025.
• It states: "FAA safety inspectors conducted extensive reviews of Boeing's production lines to ensure that this small production rate increase will be done safely."
• It states: "Our direct oversight of Boeing's production processes, implementation of its Safety Management System, and whistleblower protections has not changed."
• It states: "Safety critical personnel, including inspectors at Boeing, are continuing to work during the government shutdown."

• FAA says its inspectors reviewed Boeing's production lines for a 'small production rate increase' →Oct 17, 2025 · oversight finding

• Report designation AIR-25-04; accident number DCA24MA063.
• Documents the September 2023 door-plug rework at Boeing's Renton factory performed without required documentation, and the absence of a quality-assurance inspection of the plug closure.
• Addresses Boeing manufacturing and quality processes and FAA oversight of Boeing's voluntary safety-management practices.

• NTSB adopts final report on Alaska flight 1282 →Jun 24, 2025 · oversight finding

A shared source does not establish conduct or a direct personal relationship.

• National Transportation Safety Board →active investigation authority

• Report AIR-25-04 (accident DCA24MA063); the Board adopted the findings at its June 24, 2025 meeting for the January 5, 2024 event.
• NTSB determined the probable cause was Boeing's failure to provide adequate training, guidance, and oversight of manufacturing personnel; door-plug securing bolts were not reinstalled after the plug was opened for rework.
• NTSB found the FAA ineffective in ensuring Boeing addressed repetitive and systemic nonconformance issues related to parts-removal procedures.

• NTSB adopts final report on Alaska flight 1282 →Jun 24, 2025 · oversight finding
• Alaska Airlines flight 1282 door-plug separation →Jan 5, 2024 · active investigation

A shared source does not establish conduct or a direct personal relationship.

• National Transportation Safety Board →active investigation authority

• Product IF12843 (In Focus) by Bart Elias; references P.L. 116-260 (Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020) and P.L. 118-63 (FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024).
• Notes the 2015 Boeing-FAA settlement over quality-assurance deficiencies and Boeing's safety-management-system commitment.
• Notes the roughly 20-month worldwide grounding after the two crashes and FAA production caps imposed in early 2024.

• FAA grounds 171 737-9 MAX and halts production expansion →Jan 6, 2024 · oversight finding
• FAA rescinds the grounding order →Nov 18, 2020 · oversight finding
• Lion Air flight JT610 crashes →Oct 29, 2018 · active investigation

A shared source does not establish conduct or a direct personal relationship.

• Federal Aviation Administration →oversight authority