The centerpiece GAO report on government-wide improper payments for fiscal year 2025, drawn from agency-reported estimates.
Federal Improper Payments Oversight
Accountability file
A public-record case file for federal payment-integrity oversight, anchored on the Government Accountability Office's finding that agencies estimated about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs in fiscal year 2025. It keeps improper-payment estimates, modeled fraud-loss ranges, and adjudicated wrongdoing as distinct categories: an improper payment is an accounting and compliance measure — a payment that should not have been made or was made in the wrong amount, often from documentation or eligibility-verification gaps — and is not itself a finding of fraud or wrongdoing by any individual. No person is accused in this file.
- Updated
- Jul 23, 2026
- Source Anchors
- 11 verified
- Timeline
- 10 events
- Roles
- 4 public-record
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How the public record connects
- Subject
- Person or role
- Event
This shows the case file's most significant public-record connections only — see the Role Web and Timeline tabs for the full set. A line means a record connects two points; it is not a finding about conduct.
Publishing limits
These are the standards every anchor on this file must clear.
- Minimum source tier
- official record
- legislative record
- oversight report
- public record repository
- Living people
- For named officials or agencies, publish only source-backed public roles and exact record relationships; do not infer intent, blame, or wrongdoing from an accounting estimate.
- Victim protection
- Do not publish private or personal data; this file concerns agency- and program-level estimates, and no individual is accused.
- Social leads
- Coverage and commentary can start a lead, but published copy requires the primary GAO or OMB record, and an improper-payment estimate is never published as adjudicated fraud.
No guilt by proximity
An agency or program appearing in the same payment-integrity file is context only; a reported improper-payment rate does not imply fraud or misconduct by that agency, its officials, or any recipient.
People, institutions, and the records between them
Every public-record role in this file, grouped by kind. Open a role to read its dossier — its public-record status, what it is, and the exact records that name it. A shared record naming two roles is not a finding about conduct beyond that record.
Every public-record role
Pick a role to see its public-record status, what it is, and the exact records that name it. A shared record is not a finding about conduct.
GAO's plain-language explainer of the fiscal year 2025 improper-payment findings and its recommendations.
GAO's biennial High-Risk List update, which continues to designate improper payments and fraud as high-risk areas.
GAO testimony delivered January 13, 2026 before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on Government Operations, on anti-fraud tools, data quality, and workforce gaps. It restates the modeled annual fraud-loss range that GAO first published in April 2024 in GAO-24-105833; it does not produce it.
A GAO review of fraud-risk management across the twenty largest federally funded, state-administered programs.
The executive-branch portal that compiles agency-reported payment-accuracy and improper-payment metrics under the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019.
Timeline
- oversight finding / official#GAO issues matters for congressional consideration on reducing improper paymentsIn testimony delivered March 17, 2022, GAO put forward ten matters for congressional consideration aimed at strengthening federal-spending transparency and reducing improper payments; as of April 2026, nine of the ten remained open, per GAO-26-108694.An open matter for congressional consideration is a recommendation status, not a finding against any agency or person.
- audit report / official#GAO reports the fiscal year 2022 improper-payment estimateGAO reported that 18 agencies estimated $247 billion in improper payments across 82 programs for fiscal year 2022, including about $200 billion in overpayments. The report warned that the total excluded estimates for some risk-susceptible programs and therefore was not a complete government-wide measure.The $247 billion figure is an agency-reported improper-payment estimate over a subset of programs, not a fraud finding or a count of adjudicated losses.
- audit report / official#GAO publishes a separate government-wide fraud-loss modelGAO estimated direct annual federal fraud losses at $233 billion to $521 billion using fiscal years 2018 through 2022 data and a probabilistic model. GAO explicitly says the range is not comparable to improper-payment estimates, cannot be applied to an individual agency or program, and is not predictive.This is a modeled government-wide range with stated uncertainty, not a count of detected fraud and not a finding against any agency, program, or person.
- oversight finding / official#GAO reports the fiscal year 2023 improper-payment estimateGAO testified that agencies estimated $236 billion in improper payments across 71 programs for fiscal year 2023, about $11 billion below the prior year. GAO attributed much of the movement to temporary Medicaid eligibility flexibilities rather than treating the change as a direct measure of improved payment accuracy.Improper payments and fraud are distinct measures; this agency-reported estimate is neither a fraud finding nor a government-wide total for every federal program.
- oversight finding / official#GAO High-Risk Series update reiterates improper payments and fraud as high-risk areasGAO's biennial High-Risk List update identified 38 vulnerable areas — improper payments and fraud among them — and reported about $84 billion in benefits since 2023 from acting on its recommendations.A high-risk designation flags oversight priority, not proven loss in any single program.
- audit report / official#GAO reports the fiscal year 2024 improper-payment estimateGAO reported that 16 agencies estimated about $162 billion in improper payments across 68 programs for fiscal year 2024, including about $135 billion in overpayments. The roughly $74 billion year-over-year decline was tied largely to COVID-19 programs ending or winding down, and the report again warned that the published total covered only a subset of federal programs.The $162 billion figure is an incomplete agency-reported estimate, not a fraud finding, and its decline does not by itself establish improved payment accuracy.
- oversight finding / official#GAO testifies on data quality, workforce skills, and AI in fighting fraud and improper paymentsGAO testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on Government Operations on data quality, workforce skills, and the use of data analytics and AI against fraud. The testimony restated GAO's existing $233 billion to $521 billion modeled fraud-loss range for fiscal years 2018 through 2022 — published in April 2024 in GAO-24-105833 — and reported cumulative improper-payment estimates since fiscal year 2003 of about $2.8 trillion.Congressional testimony is an agency's account of its own prior work, not an adjudication, and the fraud-loss range it restates is a model rather than a count of proven losses.
- oversight finding / official#GAO reports fiscal year 2025 improper payments rose to an estimated $186 billionGAO reported that 15 agencies estimated about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs in fiscal year 2025, about $24 billion above fiscal year 2024. GAO attributes that increase largely to programs that reported estimates in fiscal year 2025 but did not report them in the prior fiscal year, and separately notes HHS's report of increased Medicaid improper payments from eligibility-redetermination and provider-screening errors while phasing out COVID-era flexibilities. About $153 billion (approximately 82 percent) of the total represents overpayments.The $186 billion is an improper-payment estimate, not a fraud finding or a measured loss.
Public sources ready to ingest
Import sources create source-run packets, document inventories, and review tokens. They do not publish accusations or graph relationships until the case-file evidence rules are satisfied.
Source anchors
The centerpiece GAO report on government-wide improper payments for fiscal year 2025, drawn from agency-reported estimates.
Primary GAO product page verified. The $186 billion is an estimate of improper payments, not a measured or recovered loss and not a fraud finding; GAO notes it is not comprehensive because some programs did not report an estimate.oversight reportGAO Blog: $186 Billion Was Lost to Improper Payments Last Year. How Can We Prevent Them In the Future?U.S. Government Accountability OfficeGAO's plain-language explainer of the fiscal year 2025 improper-payment findings and its recommendations.
Primary GAO explainer verified. It restates the report's estimates and names the five driver programs; it is context for, not a substitute for, the underlying GAO-26-108694 report.oversight reportGAO-26-109100: Combating Fraud — Managing Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered ProgramsU.S. Government Accountability OfficeA GAO review of fraud-risk management across the twenty largest federally funded, state-administered programs.
Primary GAO product page verified. A missing documented fraud-risk assessment is an internal-controls gap, not evidence that fraud occurred in a given program.oversight reportGAO-26-108850: Fraud and Improper Payments — Data Quality and a Skilled Workforce Are Essential for Realizing AI's Benefits (testimony)U.S. Government Accountability OfficeGAO testimony delivered January 13, 2026 before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on Government Operations, on anti-fraud tools, data quality, and workforce gaps. It restates the modeled annual fraud-loss range that GAO first published in April 2024 in GAO-24-105833; it does not produce it.
Primary GAO product page verified; this product is congressional testimony, not a report, and it restates rather than originates the fraud-loss range (see GAO-24-105833, April 16, 2024). The $233 billion to $521 billion figure is a risk-modeled estimate of fraud (fiscal years 2018–2022), distinct from the reported improper-payment total and not a count of adjudicated losses.oversight reportGAO-24-105833: Fraud Risk Management — 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated $233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to FraudU.S. Government Accountability OfficeThe April 2024 GAO report that produced the government-wide modeled fraud-loss range which GAO's later testimony and reports restate.
Primary GAO product page verified; product type Report, published and publicly released April 16, 2024. The range is a risk-modeled statistical estimate across varying risk environments, not a count of detected, charged, or recovered fraud, and it is a different measure from reported improper payments.oversight reportGAO-22-105715: Emergency Relief Funds — Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability for COVID-19 and Beyond (testimony)U.S. Government Accountability OfficeThe March 17, 2022 Comptroller General testimony that put forward the ten matters for congressional consideration on federal spending transparency and accountability whose open-versus-closed status later GAO payment-integrity reports track.
Primary GAO product verified; product type Testimony, published and publicly released March 17, 2022, delivered before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. A matter for congressional consideration is a suggestion to Congress, not a finding against any agency or person.oversight reportGAO-23-106285: Improper Payments — Fiscal Year 2022 Estimates and Opportunities for ImprovementU.S. Government Accountability OfficeGAO's report on government-wide improper-payment estimates for fiscal year 2022, one of the annual data points against which the fiscal year 2025 total is measured.
Primary GAO product verified; product type Report, published and publicly released March 29, 2023. The total is an agency-reported estimate, is not comprehensive, and is not a fraud finding; year-over-year movement can reflect program terminations and reporting changes rather than payment accuracy.oversight reportGAO-24-107660: Payment Integrity — Significant Improvements Are Needed to Address Improper Payments and Fraud (testimony)U.S. Government Accountability OfficeGAO testimony before the House Oversight and Accountability Subcommittee on Government Operations and the Federal Workforce, carrying the fiscal year 2023 government-wide improper-payment total.
Primary GAO product verified; product type Testimony, delivered September 10, 2024 by Orice Williams Brown, Chief Operating Officer. The fiscal year 2023 total is an agency-reported estimate covering a subset of federal programs and is not a fraud finding.oversight reportGAO-25-107753: Improper Payments — Information on Agencies' Fiscal Year 2024 EstimatesU.S. Government Accountability OfficeGAO's report on government-wide improper-payment estimates for fiscal year 2024 — the baseline against which the fiscal year 2025 total's roughly $24 billion increase is measured, and the product GAO-26-108694 cites for its prior-year comparison.
Primary GAO product verified; product type Q&A Report, published and publicly released March 11, 2025. The fiscal year 2024 total is an agency-reported estimate covering a subset of federal programs; GAO attributes the year-over-year decline to COVID-19 programs ending, not to a proven improvement in payment accuracy.baselineWhat the record currently supports
Claim rows are derived from timeline events and source anchors. They are evidence-status labels, not accusations or final truth claims.
What should be released next
Release requests are lawful public-record asks. They identify source gaps, review gates, and privacy constraints; they are not evidence that a specific person committed wrongdoing.
What stays unresolved
Deliberate gaps in the public record — open until the underlying records are released or reviewed, not questions we have skipped.
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For researchers & contributorsSource desk, research joins & machine-readable exportsEverything Hugin uses to grow and audit this file — connection detail, review posture, scout queue, and every export.
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How the public record is joined
Connections are navigation aids. They show where a record, event, or role is sourced; they do not convert association, correspondence, testimony requests, or document appearance into misconduct findings.
Scout queue before promotion
Default public-record source desk for cases without a hand-tuned scout profile.
Source leads and automated probes are review inventory. They become verified anchors only after Hugin can attach the public record, legal posture, and no-allegation guardrails.
Public-record joins are wired into exports
These are not loose TODOs anymore. Each lane below is computed from the case file's source tiers, then joined to matching sources, timeline events, role nodes, and release-roadmap requests.
Track the status of GAO's three fiscal year 2025 recommendations and the nine March 2022 matters that remained open as of April 2026 — one having been closed by Public Law 119-77 and one only partially addressed by Public Law 119-21 section 90102 — as agencies and Congress act.
Verify the Medicare / Medicaid / EITC / SNAP / Shuttered Venue Operators Grant dollar allocations of the $186 billion against the full GAO-26-108694 record before publishing any per-program figure.
Help grow the source queue
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Paste an official or public-record URL. Hugin classifies the lane first, keeps lead-only material quarantined, and requires source validation before anything reaches the case file.
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Case change ledger
Audit feed for source anchors, queue decisions, privacy-review jobs, and hashes. It explains the process without turning leads into claims.
PaymentAccuracy.gov — government-wide improper-payments data portal (OMB)
- Status
- needs human privacy review
- Evidence state
- metadata only
- Lane
- privacy triage
Extract document index and source metadata first.
Next: Metadata extraction includes publisher, URL, document family, and date.455d37761eecCase file hash snapshot
- Status
- hash changed when case bundle changes
- Evidence state
- metadata only
Mirrors can compare this hash to verify the same case file bundle.
Next: Compare the short hash in the UI with this machine-readable ledger.6f2ffb0777a2Document manifest hash snapshot
- Status
- hash changed when document handling changes
- Evidence state
- metadata only
This binds document mirroring and privacy-triage rules.
Next: Compare the short hash in the UI with this machine-readable ledger.1d94a64c99e3Document review queue hash snapshot
- Status
- hash changed when document jobs change
- Evidence state
- metadata only
This binds privacy-review and metadata extraction jobs.
Next: Compare the short hash in the UI with this machine-readable ledger.2c2b544a22a6Source validation hash snapshot
- Status
- hash changed when queue or validation rules change
- Evidence state
- metadata only
This binds the visible queue decisions to a machine-readable report.
Next: Compare the short hash in the UI with this machine-readable ledger.4742833475b4Submission queue hash snapshot
- Status
- hash changed when public queue rows change
- Evidence state
- metadata only
This changes when sanitized submission rows change.
Next: Compare the short hash in the UI with this machine-readable ledger.568c8362df5dGAO-26-109100: Combating Fraud — Managing Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs
- Status
- source anchor in case file
- Evidence state
- case anchor
- Lane
- oversight report
Primary GAO product page verified. A missing documented fraud-risk assessment is an internal-controls gap, not evidence that fraud occurred in a given program.
Next: Keep source-linked timeline and role claims limited to the extracted facts.90b052f8caedGAO Blog: $186 Billion Was Lost to Improper Payments Last Year. How Can We Prevent Them In the Future?
- Status
- source anchor in case file
- Evidence state
- case anchor
- Lane
- oversight report
Primary GAO explainer verified. It restates the report's estimates and names the five driver programs; it is context for, not a substitute for, the underlying GAO-26-108694 report.
Next: Keep source-linked timeline and role claims limited to the extracted facts.c74a3d326ebcGAO-26-108694: Payment Integrity — Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025
- Status
- source anchor in case file
- Evidence state
- case anchor
- Lane
- oversight report
Primary GAO product page verified. The $186 billion is an estimate of improper payments, not a measured or recovered loss and not a fraud finding; GAO notes it is not comprehensive because some programs did not report an estimate.
Next: Keep source-linked timeline and role claims limited to the extracted facts.d982bbd3abfaGAO-26-108850: Fraud and Improper Payments — Data Quality and a Skilled Workforce Are Essential for Realizing AI's Benefits (testimony)
- Status
- source anchor in case file
- Evidence state
- case anchor
- Lane
- oversight report
Primary GAO product page verified; this product is congressional testimony, not a report, and it restates rather than originates the fraud-loss range (see GAO-24-105833, April 16, 2024). The $233 billion to $521 billion figure is a risk-modeled estimate of fraud (fiscal years 2018–2022), distinct from the reported improper-payment total and not a count of adjudicated losses.
Next: Keep source-linked timeline and role claims limited to the extracted facts.586969661630