The Government Accountability Office reported today that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) sold nine pieces of export-controlled laboratory equipment as surplus from fiscal 2022 through 2025 without reporting them as controlled. To illustrate the risk, GAO investigators acquired four other pieces of federal lab equipment under fictitious identities.
What was sold, and what GAO flagged
HHS and USDA sold 1,316 laboratory-equipment listings through the General Services Administration (GSA) in fiscal years 2022 through 2025; some covered more than one piece. GAO identified nine — three freeze dryers and six mass spectrometers, seven from HHS and two from USDA — on the Commerce Department's Commerce Control List, which requires a license to export such items to certain countries because, GAO says, they "could be used by certain countries of concern to develop biological weapons or to gain a military advantage." Nine may under-report the total, GAO says: 15 of the 1,316 sales lacked detail such as a model number. Buyers included apparent resellers, a professor at a university, and one in Canada, which GAO notes needs no license for these items.
The undercover acquisitions
Between April 3 and October 31, 2025, GAO registered fictitious identities on GSA's public auction site with counterfeit documentation and bought one flagged item each from HHS and USDA. Posing as a fictitious nonprofit, it was awarded two more USDA items through a state surplus-property agency. None of the four were on the Commerce Control List, and GAO says it chose not to take physical possession.
The risk, in GAO's framing
GAO describes the risk as a "nefarious actor" building a biological weapon with the equipment, or recovering sensitive information left on it, such as research data or genetic information. Outside experts named 16 further equipment types not on the export list — including DNA sequencers and incubators — that could still be misused on a smaller scale. GAO found 251 items of those types sold on GSA's public auction in those years, and two donated.
What's missing, and what GAO wants done
Federal rules require agencies to tell GSA when an item is export-controlled; neither HHS nor USDA did so for the nine. GAO gives two reasons: GSA's listing system has no dedicated field for it, and HHS's policy, unlike USDA's, was silent on the requirement. Neither agency has assessed the risk. GAO makes four recommendations, one to GSA, two to HHS and one to USDA: GSA should develop a standard approach for flagging controlled items; HHS should revise its policy to require staff to identify them; and HHS and USDA should each regularly assess and address biosecurity risks. GSA concurred. HHS gave GAO draft revisions in July 2026 and estimated finalizing them in August 2026, a date already past at the report's public release; the report does not say whether that happened. HHS also described plans for periodic risk assessments beginning no later than October 1, 2027. USDA officials told GAO by email they "generally agree with the report." GAO's site lists all four recommendations as still open.
The two dates
GAO dates the report itself September 1, 2026; its site lists it "Publicly Released" October 1, 2026, the date used here. GAO told the requesters it planned no further distribution until 30 days from the report date unless they announced the contents sooner.